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ESTATE AND INHERITANCE TAX PROBLEMS
ARISING UNDER FEDERAL AND COLORADO
ALTERNATE VALUATION STATUTES
By THOMAS P. SWEENEYI
This note was awarded the third prize of $50 in the 1960 writ-
ing competition sponsored by the Denver Clearing House Associa-
tion Trust Officers.
INTRODUCTION
The economic circumstances which caused the passage of
Alternate Valuation Date statutes were well stated in Clark v.
United States:'
The evident purpose was to give some partial relief from
the burden of taxation of estate taxes in the case of sharply
falling market prices between the date of death and a year
thereafter. It was common knowledge that many large
estates had been seriously embarrassed by the coincidence
of heavy estate taxes and falling markets for securities
during the period between the date of the decedent's death
and the time when in ordinary course of administration,
the executor could reasonably realize upon the securities
for the payment of taxes and other costs of administration.
The period of a year was doubtless selected because that is
a customary period allowed for administration and dis-
tribution by an executor.2
When it is pointed out that the first Alternate Valuation Date
Statute was passed in 1935,3 it becomes apparent that such statutes
were enacted to alleviate estate tax problems which were caused
by the depression. In the early 1930's, the value of real and personal
property held in an estate frequently would decline to such an ex-
tent that the value of the gross estate at the time of distribution was
less than the amount of the estate and inheritance taxes payable out
of the corpus of the estate. To overcome this hardship, statutes were
passed which allowed the administrator or executor of an estate to
value the estate as of the date of death or as of one year after death.
However, property distributed during the one year period was still
required to be evaluated as of the date of distributions.
At the outset it must be stated that there has been no Colorado
Supreme Court decision involving the Colorado "Optional Valuation
Date" statute. However, since the only substantial difference be-
tween the Colorado 4 and federal 5 statutes is the method of exer-
cising the election under the statutes, Colorado might follow the
federal court decisions.
t Mr. Sweeney is a senior student at the University of Denver College of Low.
1 33 F. Supp. 216 (1940).
2 Id. at 218.
3 Rev. Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 202, 49 Stat. 1022.
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 138-4-67 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1 2032.
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PROPERTY INCLUDED IN THE ESTATE
The federal statute provides, "the value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property (except real property situ-
ated outside of the United States) to the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death."6
In applying section 2033 when the executor elects, under section
2032 (a) 7 to value the estate as of one year after date of death prob-
lems have arisen in determining the extent of the decedent's interest
in property at the date of his death.
The problem of whether the decedent had a property interest
in rents, dividends, and interest earned by the estate within one
year after decedent's death was settled in Maas v. Higgins.8 The
decedent died on August 30, 1936. In the estate tax return the
executor elected to have the value of the gross estate determined
by valuing it as of one year after decedent's death. The com-
missioner of internal revenue included in the value of the estate
rents, dividends and interest earned by the estate subsequent to
the decedent's death. The Supreme Court, in holding that the com-
missioner of internal revenue had erroneously included in the value
of estate the income earned after decednt's death, stated:
In the appraisal of a decedent's estate, rent or interest ac-
crued to the date of death is properly treated as a capital
asset. So also, on the sale of an interest bearing security,
it is the uniform practice to add to the value of the value
of the obligation, as such, accrued interest to the date of
sale. Since the statute says that, at the option of the execu-
tor, a bond may be valued as of one year subsequent to the
decedent's death, the natural conclusion is that the usual
method of valuation shall be pursued whichever date is
selected. The method always adopted for valuation at death
is the same used in fixing a sale price; that is, to take the
market value of the bond and add accrued interest to the
date of transfer, at the rate stipulated in the instrument.
It is not believed that Congress, in providing for two dates
of valuation, intended that a different method should be
followed if one date were chosen rather than the other.9
A further explanation of the includibility of dividends is neces-
sary because dividends received by the estate may be of such a
nature that the decedent had a property interest in them at the
date of his death. The regulations provide that dividends declared
to stockholders of record on or before date of the decedent's death
and not collected at the date of death constitute a part of the
estate.10 The regulations further provide that if dividends are
declared to stockholders of record after the date of decedent's death
with the effect that the shares of stock at the subsequent valuation
date do not reasonably represent the same included property of the
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 9 2033.





8 312 U.S. 443 (1941); accord, Stuart v. Hassett 41 F. Supp. 905 (1941); Hord v. United Stotes,
40 F. Supp. 697 (1941); Clark v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 216 (1940).
9 Maas v. Higgins, supro note 8, at 448
10Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(d)(4) (1958).
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gross estate as existed at the date of the decedent's death are
included property, except to the extent that they are payable out
of earnings of the corporation after the date of the decedent's death.
Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. United States" illustrates the
application of the above mentioned regulations. In the Peoples case
the executor elected to value the estate as of one year after the date
of decedent's death. Plaintiff, as executor, received for the estate
$9.25 per share during the year following the death of the decedent
in payment of arrearages on 1,915 shares of United States Steel
Corporation 7% cumulative preferred stock. The dividends are
declared after the decedent's death. The earnings and profits of the
United States Steel Corporation earned after the death of decedent
were sufficient to pay all of the dividends. The Commissioner of
internal revenue required the plaintiff to include the amount of the
dividends in the value of the estate. The court in reversing the Com-
missioner's decision held that where the executor elected to have the
decedent's estate valued for estate tax purposes as of one year after
date of death, dividends received during the year in payment of
arrearages on cumulative preferred stock owned by the estate were
not subject to the estate tax.
A further illustration of the application of the same regulation
is McGehee v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,12 which held that a
stock dividend distributed as a capitalization of income of a corpora-
tion and subsequent to a gift in contemplation of death of the shares
upon which the dividend was declared should not be regarded as a
part of the gift and should not be included in the gross estate of the
deceased donor.
VALUE OF PROPERTY INCLUDED
First to be considered is property distributed, sold, exchanged,
or otherwise disposed of within one year after the date of decedent's
death.1 3 Before the value of such included property can be ascer-
tained, a determination of the date of distribution, sale, exchange
or other disposition, mentioned in section 2032 (a) (1),14 must be
made. The regulations set forth the tests for determining the date
of distribution:
Property is considered as "distributed" upon that which occurs
first:
(i) The entry of an order or decree of distribution, if the
order or decree subsequently becomes final;
(ii) The segregation or separation of the property from the
estate or trust so that it becomes unqualifiedly subject
to the demand or disposition of the distributee; or
(iii) The actual paying over or delivery of the property to
the distributee.15
It should be noted that the above regulation determines the
date of distribution by indicating the overt acts which constitute a
distribution.
11 54 F. Supp. 742 (1944).
12 260 F. 2d 818 (1958).
13 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2032 (a) (1): "In the case of property distributed, sold, exchanged, or
otherwise disposed of, within one year after decedent's death such property shall be valued as of the
dote of distribution, sale, exchange, or other disposition."
14 Ibid.








As an illustration of what is not a distribution, it has been held
that the division of the corpus of a revocable trust, included in the
gross estate of the decedent for federal estate tax, for the purpose
of facilitating the payment of the income therefrom to certain
named individuals for life does not constitute a distribution of prop-
erty within the meaning of section 2032 of the 1954 code.'6
The date of sale, exchange or other disposition, according to the
regulations, is the efective date of the contract, unless there is not
a subsequent substantial performance of the contract. 7 The regu-
lations define the effective date of a contract as the date it is entered
into unless the contract specifies a different date.
It should be pointed out that the valuation of inventory of a
sole proprietorship involves a unique problem. No profit would be
realized upon the sale of inventory items owned at the time of death
and disposed of during the one year period after death. The inven-
tory must be valued for estate tax purposes on the basis of its value
at the date of disposition thereof if within the one year period. This
creates the problem of keeping detailed accounting records to trace
the inventory disposed of within the one year period. 18
Normally, when property included in the gross estate is dis-
tributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of within one year
of the decedent's death it is included at its fair market value on the
date of distribution or other disposition. The value of such property
which is affected by mere lapse of time will be considered below.
Next to be considered is the value of property included in the
gross estate which has not been distributed or otherwise disposed
of within one year after the decedent's death. The code provides
that such property shall be valued as of the date one year after
decedent's death.19
Estate of Hanch2 1 demonstrates how section 2032 (a) (2) has
been applied. In that case the executor elected to value the estate
one year after death. The decedent had a one-third interest in the
estate of his deceased wife, which had not yet been distributed at
the date of his death. Distribution was made to his estate less than
two months after his death. The question before the court was
whether the amount to be included in Charles C. Hanch's estate
was one-third of the value of his wife's estate as it was composed
on October 22, 1946, but valued as of October 22, 1947, of specific
assets distributed to his estate on December 18, 1946. The Tax Court
held that the decedent's interest in his wife's estate must be meas-
ured by one-third of the value of her estate as it was composed on
the date of his death, but valued one year thereafter, rather than by
the specific assets that were subsequently distributed to his estate.
Consideration is now given to includible property which is af-
fected by mere lapse of time. According to section 2032 (a) (3)
such property shall be included at its value as of the time of death
with adjustment for any difference in its value as of the alternate
valuation date not due to a mere lapse of time.
The regulations define property which is affected by mere lapse
16 Rev. Rul. 57-495, 1957 Int. Rev. Bill. No. 43, at 31.







18 Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958 Int. Rev. Bill. No. 35, at 8 throws some light on the problem. See Price,
"Alternate Valuation Dote Problems." [e.g.] N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax. p. 1245.
19 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2032 (a)(2).
20 19 T.C. 65 (1952).
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of time as patents, life estates of persons other than the decedent,
remainders, reversions, and other like properties, interests or
estates.
21
The alternate valuation of a patent may be illustrated best by
an example. Assume that the decedent owned a patent which, on the
date of his death had an unexpired term of ten years and a value
of $100,000. One year after death the patent, because of lapse of
time and other causes, had a value of $80,000. The alternate value
of the patent would be obtained by dividing $80,000 by 0.90 (ratio
of the remaining life of the patent at the alternate date to the re-
maining life of the patent at the date of the decedent's death), and
would, therefore, be $88,888.89.22
The manner for determining the value of life estates, remaind-
ers, and similar interests is stipulated in the regulations:
The values of life estates, remainders, and similar interests
are to be obtained by applying the methods prescribed in
§20.2031-1, using (i) the age of each person, the duration of
whose life may affect the value of the interest, as of the
date of the decedent's death, and (ii) the value of the prop-
erty as of the alternate date..
2
3
Estate of Welliver 2 4 is an illustration of the application of the
above regulations. In the Welliver case, the executrix elected to
value the estate as of one year after death. Among the assets of the
decedent's estate were nineteen single premium annuity contracts.
Each contract provided for the payment of $100 annually to
decedent during his life and after his death to his wife for life. The
amount necessary to purchase nineteen comparable annuity con-
tracts for the life of decedent's wife, computed on the basis of the
annuity table and interest rate currently used by the issuing com-
panies in calculating annuity premiums, was $26,706 on April 14,
1943, the date of decedent's death, and $25,821.20 on April 14, 1944.
If computed on the basis of the annuity table and interest rates
used by the companies when the nineteen contracts were made, the
aggregate premiums for nineteen comparable annuity contracts
for life of decedent's wife would be $21,577 on April 14, 1943, and
$20,886.20 on April 14, 1944. On the estate tax return the nineteen
contracts were included among the assets of the estate; their aggre-
gate value under option was reported as $20,886.20, their value at
death, as $21,557. The Commissioner assigned them a value of
$26,706 in determining the value of the gross estate. In sustaining
the Commissioner's contention, the Tax Court held that as the con-
tracts were interests affected by a mere lapse of time their value
at decedent's death is an amount includible in the gross estate. The
value of the contracts at decedent's death is the amount for which
comparable contracts could have been purchased from the issuing
company under the annuity table and interest rate then used by
it in computing premiums.
21 Treas. Reg. I 20.2032-1(f) (1958).
22 Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(f)(2) (1958).
23Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(f)(1) (1958); Price, "Alternate Valuation Date Problems," )e.g.I N.Y.U.
17th Inst. on Fed. Tax p. 1245 at 1246-7 states, "To eliminate from the value as of the alternate date,
changes in value due to mere lapse of time, the value of annuities, and of life, remainder and rever-
sionary interests are to be obtained by applying the factor applicable as of the date of death, rather
than as of the alternate date. However, the factor is applied to the reduced value of the property."
24 8 T.C. 165 (1947).
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Estate of Hance2 5 illustrates one possible result where the per-
son whose life expectancy afects the value of the interest dies during
the year period. Hance died on February 22, 1947, survived by his
widow. The executor elected to value Hance's estate as of one year
after date of death. The estate included seven single premium an-
nuity contracts payable to the decedent for life and thereafter to
his widow for life. The widow died on May 15, 1947, at the age of
83 years and 9 months. In the return the contracts were valued at
$44,632.92. This valuation was arrived at by discounting at a rate of
4% the total payments which would have been received by the
widow on the basis of her life expectancy at the time of decedent's
death without regard for the fact that she died on May 15, 1947. The
Commissioner determined that these contracts should be valued on
the basis of the cost of similar policies issued on the date of deced-
ent's death to a female applicant of the same age as the surviving
widow. The total cost of such policies would have been $125,905.27.
The petitioner conceded that the Commissioner had correctly valued
the annuity policies as of the date of decedent's death but contends
that because of the election to have the estate valued as of the date
one year after death, the Commissioner erred in failing to allow an
adjustment for the difference in value as of the later date not due
to mere lapse of time. The Tax Court held that the amount to be
included in the gross estate is the figure representing the payment
actually received by the widow, notwithstanding that as of the op-
tional date the annuities were worthless.
26
It is apparent, that if the executor had not elected to value the
estate as of the atlernate valuation date, the death of Mrs. Hance
would not have affected the value of the annuity, but it would have
been included in her husband's estate valued according to her life
expectancy at the time of Hance's death.
SPECIAL RULES AFFECTING DEDUCTIONS
A section of the code 27 provides that there shall be no deduction
if such deduction is in effect given by the alternate valuation. The
25 18 T.C. 499 (1952).
26 Price, "Alternate Valuation Date Problem," [e.g.] N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1245 at 1247.
"The Tax Court held that only the increase in the cost of the annuity between the decedent's death
and the annuitant's death should be included in the decedent's estate. The Court based this conclusion
on the fact that the annuity lost its value due to the annuitant's death, and not to mere lapse of time.
The only loss in value due to mere lapse of time was the difference between the value of the annuity
at the decedent's death and at the annuitant's death, and this was all that could be inlcuded in the
decedent's estate."
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2032 (b).
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provisions contained in this section are designed to prevent the
decline in value from resulting in a double deduction, and also
correlate the value with the amount of the deduction. For example,
the executor in valuing the taxable estate can deduct losses from
fire, storm, shipwreck, theft or other casualties.28 But, if alternate
valuation is elected, such losses cannot be taken because the value
of the property one year after death reflects the occurence of these
deductions.
Section 2032 (b) further provides the means for evaluating
property which is the subject of a charitable 9 or marital :t ' deduc-
tion. Such property will be valued for purposes of the deduction
in the following manner: the value as of the date of death will
be adjusted to reflect the value as of the alternate valuation date.
However, if any portion of the difference in value is attributable
to a mere lapse of time, or to the occurrence or non-occurrence of
a contingency adjustment will not be allowed as to this portion.
It is apparent from the language of section 2032 (b) that if the
valuation of property for purposes of the charitable and marital
deduction depends upon the duration of an individual's life, his life
expectancy at the time of the decedent's death should be used, even
though the alternate valuation date is elected and the measuring
life ceases during the year period. The reason for this result is that
the provision dealing with the charitable and marital deduction
eliminates changes in value caused by mere lapse of time and
changes in value resulting from the occurence or non-occurrence
of a contingency. Therefore, when the person dies during the year
period this is the occurrence of a contingency which is to be dis-
regarded.3 1
TIME OF ELECTION
If the executor or administrator desires to take advantage of
the provisions of the federal and Colorado alternate valuation
statutes, he must so elect because these provisions do not operate
automatically. The election, in the case of federal estate tax, must
be indicated on the estate tax return, which, under section 6075
and 6018,1- is required to be filed within fifteen months from the
date of the decedent's death or within the period of any extension
of time granted by the district director under section 6081Y. How-
ever, in the case of Colorado Inheritance Tax, the election is exer-
cised by filing with the inheritance tax commissioner, within fifteen
months from the death of the decedent or any written extension
therefrom granted by the commissioner, a supplement to the sworn
statement required by statute,1' 4 setting forth the values applicable
to each item of property included in the estates as of the alternate
valuation date.1 5
After the expiration of the above mentioned times no election
may be exercised, nor may a previous election be revoked. Also,
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2054.
29 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2055.
34 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
31 See Price, "Alternate Valuation Dote Problems," N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1245.
32 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, H§ 6075, 6018.
33 lt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6018 (a).
34 Cola. Rev. Stat. 9 138-4-42 (1953).
35 Supro note 4.
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if the election is exercised it applies to all of the property included
in the gross estate.
3 6
Rosenfield v. United States3 7 demonstrates the binding effect
of the election. In that case the court held that where the election
to have the gross estate of the decedent valued for estate tax pur-
poses as of the date one year after death was made upon full dis-
closure of the facts, such election was binding upon the estate and
could not be revoked after the expiration of the time for filing the
return on the ground that the election was made upon a mistake as
to the consequences of such election.
Estate of Downe4 illustrates what constitutes a timely filing of
the election. The estate tax return of Henry S. Downe was due on
March 8, 1940. The return was mailed on March 8, 1940, but not
received in the collector's office until March 9, 1940. The Tax Court
held that the return must reach the collector's office on or before
the date on which the return is required to be filed and therefore
there was not a timely filing on the return. Consequently, Downe's
estate could not be valued as of one year after the date of death.
The Downe case should be contrasted with Doriss et al. v.
Commissioner.9 In the Doriss case, the due date for filing of the
estate tax return was April 14, 1938. On the morning of that date
an estate tax return was mailed from New York City to Albany,
and addressed to the collector of internal revenue at the latter
city, whose offices were in the post office building. He main-
tained a post office box and sent for his mail several times a day,
usually not after 2:30 P.M. His office hours were from 9 A.M. to
4:30 P.M. The return reached the Albany post office at 5 P.M. on
April 14, and was placed in the collector's post office box. It was not
called for by the collector until the following morning and was
stamped received as of April 15. In this return the executor of the
estate elected to have the gross estate valued as of a date one year
after decedent's death. The Tax Court held that when the return
in question had reached the collector's post office box, it had gone
as far on its way to the collector as the post office department
would take it. Thereafter it was subject to the control of the col-
lector and available to him at any time. Under the circumstance
shown here, the return was mailed in ample time to reach the office
of the collector on the due date and was therefore timely filed with-
in the meaning of the controlling regulation.
36 Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(b)(2) (1958).
37 254 F. 2d 940 (1958); Certiorari denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958).
38 3 T.C. 967 (1943); Estate of Flinchbaugh 1 T.C. 653 (1943).
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When it is called to mind that the income tax basis of property
included in the gross estate is its value at the date of death, or the
alternate valuation date if alternate valuation is used, it becomes
apparent that in addition to the usual estate tax consequences aris-
ing from the alternate valuation, there are income tax consequences
which may outweigh the estate tax consequences.
When Congress added this election to the law, it merely intend-
ed it as a relief measure for those estates which had suffered severe
declines in value. In spite of the fact that it was enacted as a relief
measure, the use of this election now presents problems undoubt-
edly not contemplated at the time of its passage. Therefore, it is
necessary to consider, in addition to relative values, the inclusion of
assets, their subsequent basis, income tax consequences and the ef-
fect on the beneficiary's legacies.
4 0
40 See Price, "Alternate Valuation Date Problem," N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax p. 1245 at 1265.
1265.
CASE COMMENT
LABOR RELATIONS - CONTRACTS -
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM
John L. Lewis and others, as trustees for a union welfare and
retirement fund, brought an action against Benedict Coal Corpora-
tion for payments allegedly due as the result of a collective bar-
gaining agreement entered into between Benedict and The United
Mine Workers of America. The company cross-claimed, asserting
that the contract providing for the payments had been violated by
the union and that the company was entitled to set-off damages
arising from this breach against payments into the fund. The trial
court found that the payments were due the trustees as alleged, but
also found that Benedict was entitled to damages for the breach of
the collective bargaining agreement by the union. The judgment
against the union was given immediate execution with the proceeds
to be paid into the registry of the court, while the judgment for the
trustees was limited to satisfaction from the fund so created. The
effect of this judgment, therefore, was allowance of the set-off
against the third-party beneficiary of contract damages arising from
a breach by the promisee. This decision was affirmed, except as to
the amount of damages, by the Circut Court of Appeals, but was
reversed by the Supreme Court on the grounds that it was against
sound labor policy to allow such set-off. Lewis v. Benedict Coal
Corporation, 80 Sup. Ct. 489 (1960).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in an excellently reasoned dissent,
recognized the fact that this decision is against the great weight of
authority of contract law and that sound labor policy did not re-
quire this decision.
The general rule is well established that the rights of a third-
